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Summary
Th ere is much controversy surrounding the nature of the relation between fi c-
tional individuals and possible individuals. Some have argued that no fi ctional 
individual is a possible individual; others have argued that (some) fi ctional indi-
viduals just are (merely) possible individuals. In this paper, I off er further grounds 
for believing the theory of fi ctional individuals defended by Amie Th omasson, 
viz., Artifactualism, by arguing that her view best allows one to make sense of 
this puzzling relation. More specifi cally, when we realize that the view allows for 
an identifi cation of merely possible individuals with fi ctional individuals, we see 
that the utility, and hence the level of credence lent to Artifactualism, is increased. 
After arguing for this thesis, I respond to three of the most pressing worries.
1. Introduction
Sherlock Holmes is an individual that sprang, in some sense, from the mind 
of Sir Conan Doyle. But Holmes is a fi ctional individual; he does not exist. 
Or so it seems. But could Holmes have existed? Is he among the realm of 
possible individuals? Th e intrinsically identical iron spheres fi rst discussed 
by Max Black in his famous (1952), taken by some to refute one version of 
Leibniz’s Law, seemingly do not exist either; the spheres are merely possible 
individuals. And the spheres are individuals that seem tightly analogous, 
in various other important ways, to Sherlock Holmes. For example, they 
may not be the subject of an elaborate work of fi ction—they simply are 
individuals discussed by a philosopher in a fairly short narrative meant to 
enlighten our thinking about metaphysics and logic—but the spheres also 
sprang, in some sense, from the mind of Black.
Let us call the problem embodied by the following question the fi ctiona-
lia/possibilia problem: What is the nature of the relation between fi ctional 
individuals (or fi ctionalia) and merely possible individuals (or possibilia)? 
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Some (famously, Saul Kripke) have argued that the correct answer to this 
problem is that no fi ctional individual is a possibilium.1 Others (famously, 
David Lewis) have defended the claim that taking (some) fi ctionalia to 
be types of possibilia provides the correct answer.2 In this paper, I wish 
to draw on the parallels between fi ctionalia and possibilia to argue for a 
diff erent sort of view. I wish to defend the solution that all possibilia are 
fi ctionalia. But I do not wish to argue that any view of fi ctionalia will 
allow for such an identifi cation; it is only the theory attributable to Amie 
Th omasson, viz., Artifactualism,3 that can provide adequate resources to 
solve the fi ctionalia/possibilia problem in this way. And this service that her 
view is able to provide, I maintain, lends credence to Artifactualism as the 
correct theory of fi ctionalia. Th ese are the central theses of this paper.
I will begin by presenting and explaining two of the most prominent 
views concerning the relation between possibilia and fi ctionalia (viz., 
Lewisianism and Artifactualism). I next wish to defend the argument 
in favor of the identifi cation thesis stated above. Some not-too-distant 
relatives of this sort of solution to the fi ctionalia/possibilia problem (viz., 
Neo-Meinongianism and Modal Fictionalism) already exist, however, so 
I next intend to present these views along with an explanation of their 
inadequacy. I will then respond to three of the most pressing sorts of wor-
ries for my central theses.
2.  How possibilists and some actualists solve the fi ctionalia/possibilia 
problem
Let us call the philosopher who endorses the following thesis an actualist4: 
No merely possible, nonactual individuals (i.e., possibilia)5 exist. So, the 
1. See Kripke 1980, 157f.
2. See Lewis 1978.
3. I have in mind the view she presents and defends in her (1999). Others, though, have 
defended Artifactualism at length—Nathan Salmon (1998), e.g.
4. Th is is, in some ways, not a standard usage of this label. ‘Actualist’ often refers to one 
who believes a related thesis about the non-existence of (whole) merely possible worlds. Similar 
remarks apply below to the usage of ‘possibilist’. More to the point, there is no unique way of 
drawing the distinction between actualists and possibilists. Just consider what follows to be one 
theoretically interesting way. For an extremely helpful, accessible discussion of other important 
ways to cash out an actualist/possibilist distinction, see Takashi Yagisawa (2008).
5. ‘Possibilia’ in this paper will mean merely possible individuals. Of course, all actual individu-
als are possible individuals, but I’ll be reserving this term for nonactual possible individuals.
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actualist denies, for instance, that there are, e.g.: talking donkeys; 50-foot 
tall women; and ducks with wheels for their appendages. Th e actual-
ist thinks it possible that there be such things, but in fact there aren’t.6 
She asserts that reality is exhausted by the things there are—that which 
is actual—and that which merely could be—that which is possible but 
nonactual—is nothing at all.7
Next consider the possibilist. Th e possibilist rejects the thesis of the 
actualist. Th e possibilist believes that there are some merely possible indi-
viduals in existence. But the possibilist further believes, in accord with 
the actualist, that reality is exhausted by the things there are. How can 
this be? Aren’t possibilia the sorts of things that, by their very nature, do 
not in fact exist, i.e., are not part of reality? Well, the possibilist adds the 
following semantic theses by way of reconciliation. Th e term ‘actual’ is an 
indexical. For us, it denotes our world, our corner of reality. But there are 
other worlds, other corners of reality, and those worlds (nonactual for us) 
are actual for the denizens there. Further, the possibilist adds that we usually 
restrict the scope of our quantifi ers in everyday parlance about what things 
exist. When we say ‘Th ere are no 50-foot tall women’, we ordinarily just 
mean: there are no 50-foot tall women in our corner of reality. Th ere are 
50-foot tall women, according to the possibilist, just none here. Th us, this 
sort of philosopher may also hold that reality is exhausted by the things 
there are—it’s just that some of the things there are are not in our corner 
of reality, not here at our world. Such off -world individuals are identifi ed 
by the possibilist with the set of possibilia.8
Now let us consider a possibilist who further endorses the following 
view of fi ctionalia. Call this person a Lewisian.9 A Lewisian holds that 
6. In this paper I will be using the verb ‘exist’ and ‘is’ (and their cognates) interchange-
ably, at least until I get to an explicit discussion of Meinong and Neo-Meinongian views about 
fi ctionalia and possibilia.
7. I think the slogan “reality is exhausted by the things there are” is helpful here, but it isn’t 
altogether perfect; it suggests that questions about what there is to reality can be settled purely 
by ontology. Someone who accepts the so-called “truthmaker principle” would likely take the 
slogan to be literally true, but many metaphysicians would maintain that a list of all the things 
that exist would still leave out some of what comprises reality, e.g., truths concerning which 
things have which properties. Th anks to Ted Sider for pointing this out.
8. Not every possibilist accepts this indexical theory of actuality. Lewis (1986) argues for 
this view, and this fi ts his particular brand of modal reductionism. See Phillip Bricker (2006), 
however, for a version of possibilism that eschews an indexical theory of actuality.
9. Th e view I will be calling Lewisianism is very close to the sort of view espoused by Lewis 
(1978)—hence the name for the view. Th ere may be some things I attribute to the Lewisian, 
however, that Lewis himself would not accept.
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some fi ctionalia, specifi cally, all the ones having co-instantiable properties, 
just are possibilia. So, according to Lewisianism, Sherlock Holmes exists. 
Holmes is not here, but he does exist in another corner of reality. He is 
a fl esh and blood, pipe-smoking, cocaine-using solver of crimes in some 
alternate possible world. Holmes, like many fi ctional individuals, does not 
have properties that fail to be co-instantiable (or so we’ll assume for present 
purposes); that is, Holmes is not an impossible individual. Impossibilia, 
according to Lewisians, exist in no corner of reality.
So, one answer to the fi ctionalia/possibilia problem is provided by Lewis-
ianism: fi ctionalia just are a type of possibilia. When we engage in discourse 
about putative fi ctionalia having co-instantiable properties, it turns out 
on this view that we are simply speaking of certain extant individuals that 
are off -world relative to us; when we engage in discourse about putative 
fi ctionalia that have properties that fail to be co-instantiable, we are speak-
ing about nothing at all.
Th ere are some well-known problems with the viability of this sort of 
solution to the fi ctionalia/possibilia problem. Th e following oft-discussed 
diffi  culty10 seems to me to be suffi  cient to refute Lewisianism (although I 
will not spend time defending that claim here). If the fi ctional individual 
Sherlock Holmes, e.g., is to be identifi ed with a possibilium, then it must 
be the case that there is some unique fl esh and blood, pipe-smoking, 
cocaine-using crime solver in an alternate possible world that is Holmes. 
But there is no such thing. In fact, there are an infi nite number of merely 
possible entities that satisfy all that is true about Holmes in the Holmes 
stories, and any identifi cation of Holmes with exactly one of these indi-
viduals would be utterly arbitrary; the identifi cation of Holmes with more 
than one of these individuals, or the totality of them, would be absurd.
Th is failure motivates an alternate solution to the fi ctionalia/possibilia 
problem, an actualist sort of solution.11 Th ere are a few ways such a solu-
tion might proceed. One way is Kripkeanism—the view that not only do 
fi ctionalia fail to exist (here in the one and only world), they are one and 
all impossible.12 I intend to briefl y say something about the viability of 
10. See, e.g., Alvin Plantinga (1974, 154f.) and Amie Th omasson (1999, 17f.) for a discus-
sion of this issue.
11. Even with the success of the just-discussed objection, it may be that possibilism is still true. 
Perhaps the possibilist just needs a diff erent sort of account of fi ctionalia than the one given by 
Lewisianism. I will not take the time here, however, to explore how such an account might go.
12. I call this view Kripkeanism because it is suggested by Kripke (1980, 157f.). Kripke 
himself seems not to be a Kripkean; he seems to be an Artifactualist of some sort. At least, he 
seems to endorse Artifactualism in his (1973).
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this solution at the start of Section 4. Another sort of anti-realist (about 
fi ctionalia) solution that is clearly consistent with actualism is Modal 
Fictionalism. I will discuss that view in Section 5. Th e sorts of actualist 
solutions that I wish to discuss at length now, however, are the ones that 
are consistent with Amie Th omasson’s Artifactualism.
Artifactualism maintains that fi ctional individuals exist; they are not 
spatiotemporal or concrete entities (it is thus sometimes said that they are 
not “real”), but they are extant bits of abstracta created by the authors who 
fi rst wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. Fictional individuals are thus under-
stood as artifacts. Th ey are contingent actualia whose existence depends 
in various ways on (the intentions of various) authors, (the intentions 
present in) appropriate audiences, and physical instances of story-copies 
that mention them.13
Unlike the above discussion of Lewisianism, I wish to explicitly discuss 
the main motivation for Artifactualism; this will prove to be crucial to 
my defense of the central theses of this paper. Th e locus classicus of the 
argument that has convinced most Artifactualists was presented by Peter 
van Inwagen (2001) (although it appears that van Inwagen himself is not 
a card-carrying Artifactualist).14 Van Inwagen fi rst asks us to consider 
sentences like the following:
C:  Sherlock Holmes is a character created by Conan Doyle.
F:   Sherlock Holmes is a more famous fi ctional detective than Nancy 
Drew.
A:  Sherlock Holmes appears in the story “A Scandal in Bohemia”.
C, F, and A are, to use van Inwagen’s terminology, examples of sentences of 
literary criticism. Th at is, they are part of “all ‘informed’ discourse about 
the nature, content, and value of literary works”.15 I shall call sentences 
relevantly similar to C, F and A extra-fi ction sentences. An extra-fi ction 
sentence is one that, at least apparently, associates via the ordinary exem-
plifi cation relation some property with a fi ctional individual. Th is is not, 
according to van Inwagen, the only way a property may (apparently) be 
13. Again, the most thorough presentation and defense of Artifactualism, along with an 
explication of these alleged dependence relations, can be found in Th omasson (1999).
14. While van Inwagen thinks fi ctionalia are contingent abstracta, he seems to deny in his 
(2003) that they come about due to our activities in the way that Th omasson (1999) alleges.
15. Van Inwagen 2001, 45. Th e displayed sentences in the following paraphrase of van 
Inwagen’s argument are my own.
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associated with a fi ctional individual, however. Some properties come to 
be associated with a fi ctional individual in virtue of what is “true in world 
of the fi ction(s)” that mention that individual; these are the properties 
the individual holds.16 Sentences expressing this latter sort of association 
between a fi ctional individual and a property I shall call intra-fi ction sen-
tences. Th e following are instances of this type of sentence:
U:  Sherlock Holmes is a cocaine-user.
P:  Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe.
S:  Sherlock Holmes is a crime-solver.
Now, the crux of van Inwagen’s argument is this: there appears to either 
be no way whatsoever, or at least no theoretically attractive way, to provide 
the semantics of extra-fi ction sentences without quantifying over “creatures 
of fi ction”, e.g., fi ctional individuals such as Sherlock Holmes. Th at is, 
C, F and A—unlike U, P, and S—are the sorts of sentences that are not 
about any property that any literary work associates with Holmes; they 
are sentences that appear to be about properties exemplifi ed by Holmes 
simpliciter (properties associated with Holmes from a “real world” perspec-
tive). But the best explanation (that is, the simplest, most elegant sort of 
semantic account) for the fact that C, F, and A are all meaningful and 
all true is that appearances are not deceiving here. Sherlock Holmes is an 
extant individual that in fact has the properties expressed by the predicates 
appearing in those sentences. C, F, and A ought to be taken at face value. 
And since we are epistemically justifi ed in accepting the concomitant 
ontological commitments of our best explanations, we are justifi ed in 
committing ourselves to the existence of Sherlock Holmes.
Now, the conclusion of this argument is completely general. Th us, an 
Artifactualist who accepts van Inwagen’s line will assert that all of our 
discourse about putatively fi ctional individuals is discourse about extant 
individuals.17 Sherlock Holmes and Cinderella and James Tiberius Kirk 
are all denizens of our world, the only world. But they are not fl esh and 
blood crime-solvers or ball-attendees or starship captains. Th ey are abstract 
16. Th is is van Inwagen’s (2003) terminology. His (2001) terminology is diff erent; the hold-
ing relation in this earlier work is called ‘ascription’. For a full discussion of the nature of the 
ascription relation see his (2001, especially 49–54).
17. Some care is needed here. Even some realists about fi ctionalia believe that we may only 
succeed in referring to fi ctionalia when the appropriate intentions to refer are present in us. See 
David Braun (2005) for an example of a realist of this sort.
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entities, and as such, are not the sorts of things that can possibly solve 
crimes, attend balls, and captain starships. In fact, they do not have any 
of the properties they hold in the fi ctions that mention them; the proper-
ties they have, rather, are the properties expressed in the true extra-fi ction 
sentences that mention them.
So, one way to state an Artifactualist solution to the fi ctionalia/possibilia 
problem is this: No fi ctionalia are possibilia (because the former actually 
exist while the latter lack existence simpliciter). Now, this sounds on the 
face of it to be the Kripkean solution, but of course it is distinct. An Arti-
factualist would assert that all fi ctionalia are possibilia in the sense that 
anything that actually exists possibly exists; the claim here is just that none 
are merely possible (nonactual) individuals.
3. An argument for fi ctionalia as modal artifacts
So, Artifactualism identifi es all fi ctionalia with abstract, yet contingent 
actualia.18 Th is is one way to understand her solution to the fi ctionalia/
possibilia problem. But there is another sort of solution consistent with 
Artifactualism that is more enlightening regarding the nature of the fi c-
tionalia/possibilia relation—one that informs our modal theorizing and 
thereby lends credence to Artifactualism. Let me explain.
While actualists deny the existence of nonactual possibilia, most wish 
to claim that there are nonetheless (extant) individuals that can go proxy 
for—serve as surrogates for—such (nonexistent) entities. Th at is, they real-
ize that our modal discourse requires truthmakers, that we sometimes say 
true things that seem on the face of it to commit us to possibilia. Various 
types of actualia have been proposed as such truthmakers (properties, say 
some, words, say others).19 I believe that the best sorts of actualia to pro-
pose as the surrogates for the genuine possibilia of the possibilist are the 
fi ctionalia of the Artifactualist.
18. And assuming—safely it seems!—that our world is not an impossible world, all Arti-
factualist fi ctionalia will have co-instantiable properties. A fi ctional work about a detective who 
is not a detective—call him Sholumbo—would not be about an individual that both has and 
lacks the property being a detective; Sholumbo just lacks this property. Sholumbo holds these 
incompatible properties, but that, of course, entails nothing about the impossibility of our world, 
just the impossibility of the “fi ctional world” Sholumbo inhabits.
19. See, e.g., Alvin Plantinga (1974) for a view on which properties are the surrogates for 
possibilia. It’s open to someone who endorses the view of modality known as Linguistic Ersatzism 
(e.g., Th eodore Sider 2002) to hold that words are the proper surrogates for possibilia.
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We often take certain individuals to be merely possible for the sake of 
some (philosophical or quasi-philosophical) discussion. Th at is, we often 
do modal storytelling. We do this whenever we use counterexamples or 
thought experiments or consider counterfactual scenarios to advance our 
philosophical (or scientifi c) understanding. Now, simply put, I think this 
type of discourse commits us to fi ctionalia of the Artifactualist variety. But 
if these sorts of fi ctional individuals are playing these roles in our modal 
theorizing, we ought to admit that possibilia just are such fi ctionalia.
It is helpful to think about the following regimented version of the 
argument just given:
Th e Argument for Modal Artifactualism
1.   A thought experiment (taken to include counterexamples and 
other sorts of counterfactual scenarios) is just a primitive sort of 
fi ction.
2.  Th e individuals mentioned in fi ctions exist.
3.   Th erefore, the individuals mentioned in thought experiments 
exist.
4.   If thought-experiment individuals exist, then discourse about pos-
sibilia just is discourse about fi ctionalia of the sort posited by the 
Artifactualist.
5.   Th erefore, discourse about possibilia just is discourse about fi ctio-
nalia of the sort posited by the Artifactualist.
Call an Artifactualist who supplements her view of fi ctionalia with the 
conclusion of this argument a Modal Artifactualist. Th is identifi cation of 
possibilia with fi ctionalia provides a valuable service. It allows us to see 
that we do indeed have some actual world surrogates that are suited to 
play the role of nonactual possibilia. We need truthmakers to ground our 
modal discourse, to make sense of our modal theorizing that we engage 
in via thought experiments and counterfactuals and counterexamples, and 
with fi ctionalia of the Artifactualist variety, we have that. Th is service-
ability lends credence to the view; whatever its merits already, we have 
further reason to believe Artifactualism once we realize it’s potential scope. 
(Which is not to say that it can provide every service we are looking for 
when it comes to surrogates for possibilia—more on this in Section 6.) 
Now, perhaps other actualist views of fi ctionalia are at least as serviceable 
in this regard, or even more so. In that case, they would need to be adju-
dicated on other grounds. But I intend to argue in Section 5 that either 
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the prominent rival views fail to be as serviceable as Artifactualism, or they 
are epistemically less worthwhile for independent reasons.
4.  A discussion of the premises of the Argument for Modal Artifactualism, 
with a critical focus on premise 4
I believe the Argument for Modal Artifactualism is sound. I thus believe 
that Kripkeanism must be false. But what justifi es the premises of this 
argument? Premise 1 is supported by some very natural intuitions about 
the nature of thought experiments (construed in a broad sense). At least 
when one begins with the intuitively more sensible ontological framework 
of the actualist, one then wonders: What could philosophers be doing 
when they engage in relating thought experiments if they are not just 
telling stories, creating primitive (and often very short) works of fi ction?20 
No other option seems plausible. Premise 2 is supported by van Inwagen’s 
line of reasoning discussed in Section 2, and his argument there appears 
sound. Th ere are true extra-hypothetical sentences about thought-experiment 
individuals just as there are true extra-fi ction sentences about traditional 
fi ctionalia. Here are some examples of true extra-hypothetical sentences:
L:   Th e iron spheres that allegedly constitute a counterexample to one 
version of Leibniz’s Law were fi rst discussed by Max Black.
H:  Th e intrinsically identical iron spheres are hypothetical individu-
als.
M:  Many philosophers, but few laymen, have heard about Black’s iron 
spheres.
Applying van Inwagen’s line, it seems that the best way to understand 
L, H, and M, and sentences of their ilk, is to take them at face value.21 
20. I will be using the expression ‘thought experiment’ in a very liberal way throughout this 
paper; any imaginative scenario in which some merely possible situation is entertained will count. 
Even when ‘thought experiment’ is used in a more restrictive, technical sense (e.g., a method used 
by philosophers and scientists alike to arrive at new information by considering hypothetical 
scenarios), it seems the relevant similarities between thought-experiment narratives (and their 
characters) and fi ctional narratives (and their characters) are many. For further discussion of 
these similarities, see Charles Cross (1995), David Davies (2007), and Roy Sorensen (1992, 
especially 246ff .). For an extended discussion regarding some relevant dissimilarities between 
thought-experiment characters and fi ctional characters, see Alberto Voltolini (1995).
21. I don’t think taking them at face value, as true simpliciter, thereby commits us to any 
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Contrary to some initial intuitions, then, it follows that we are quantify-
ing over extant bits of abstract actualia when we talk about Black’s iron 
spheres. And these results are perfectly general. Black’s iron spheres, Sidney 
Shoemaker’s Brownson,22 and Frank Jackson’s brilliant neurophysiologist, 
Mary,23 are all extant individuals. But these are not (despite what we call 
them) individuals made of iron or fl esh and blood. Th ey are abstract enti-
ties, and as such, are not the sorts of things that can possibly be made of 
iron or fl esh and blood. Th ey in fact have none of the properties associated 
with them in the thought experiments that mention them; rather, thought-
experiment individuals (merely) hold the properties associated with them 
by the authors of the modal stories that mention them.
But Premise 4 of the above argument is the one that requires the most 
consideration. Why think it’s true? I claim that all discourse about pos-
sibilia is really just discourse about Artifactualist fi ctionalia because such 
fi ctionalia are best-suited to stand in as surrogates for genuine possibilia. 
But Kit Fine has provided a seemingly quite powerful argument for think-
ing that discourse about possibilia cannot turn out to be discourse about 
any kind of actual world surrogate whatsoever. Fine states:
Can [an actualist] maintain that possibilia are really just Ys, for some actu-
alistically acceptable description Y (i.e., for some description that makes no 
reference to merely possible objects)? … Could not every possible X be identi-
cal to an actual Y, for some actualistically acceptable description Y?
It seems to me that no view of this sort can be correct. Suppose, to fi x our 
ideas, that it is maintained that every (merely) possible person is identical to 
an actual property—one perhaps that specifi es its ‘essence’. Consider now a 
possible person. Th en it is possibly a person. But no property is possibly a 
person and so no possible person is identical to a property: for there is a pos-
sibility for the one, namely that of being a person, which is not a possibility 
for the other.24
particular theory of defi nite descriptions, specifi cally, it doesn’t commit us to a Russellian 
understanding of ‘the iron spheres’. Pace Russell, true sentences using that expression may fail 
to entail that there exists something which is spherical and iron. In fact, I think a theory of 
defi nite descriptions which places defi nite descriptions semantically on a par with proper names 
(at least in some contexts) is correct. For the details of how such a view might go, see Keith 
Donnellan (1966).
22. Discussed in Shoemaker 1963, 23f.
23. Discussed in Jackson 1982, 130.
24. Fine 2003, 163; the emphasis is my own.
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Th is argument, however, does not successfully constitute grounds to 
reject Premise 4. A (merely) possible person for the Modal Artifactualist 
would not be considered, as Fine infers, possibly a person; the entities 
that serve as surrogates for merely possible people, according to this view, 
do not have the modal property in question. (Artifactualist fi ctionalia do 
not lack modal properties altogether, but insofar as each is an abstractum, 
each is essentially an abstractum, hence not possibly made of fl esh and 
blood, hence not possibly a person, etc.) But this is no theoretical draw-
back. While the fi ctionalia-cum-possibilia do not have any of the modal 
properties associated with them by their respective thought experiments, 
they nonetheless are intimately associated with such modal properties via 
the holding relation. And this association is all that’s required to preserve 
the core intuitions we have about possibilia such as (Shoemaker’s) Brown-
son or (Jackson’s) Mary, e.g. While Brownson is not possibly a person, 
he holds the property personhood in the counterfactual scenario described 
(that is, he is a person in Shoemaker’s thought experiment just as Holmes 
is a detective in Conan Doyle’s work). And this is precisely the right thing 
to say about such an individual, I believe. Maintaining that these actual 
individuals (viz., the Artifactualist’s fi ctionalia) are what play the theoretical 
role of genuine possibilia (and thereby adhering to the slogan: “possibilia 
just are fi ctionalia”) seems to be the only plausible way to simultaneously 
maintain both the intuition that merely possible (nonactual) individuals 
do not (“really”) exist (because the only concrete, spatiotemporal entities 
in existence are those in the one and only actual world) and the intuition 
that possibilia are intimately associated with the properties we take them to 
be associated with (because there are perfectly acceptable actual-world sur-
rogates playing the possibilia role and holding the relevant properties).
While Fine’s argument fails to undermine premise 4, more still needs 
to be said about the positive motivation for that premise. Why think that 
the surrogates on off er from the Artifactualist theory of fi ctionalia are 
the actualia best-suited to play the role of genuine possibilia? Well, some 
motivation can be found in the work of Charles Cross (1995).25 Cross 
25. Cross merely suggests the identifi cation of possibilia with fi ctionalia that I am explicitly 
endorsing here. He explicitly states:
Having postulated fi ctional characters we might, like Sorensen, simply classify thought 
experiments as stories. Th ought experiment characters would then turn out to be a subclass 
of fi ctional characters, but I see no need to make the move that leads to this result. What is 
important are the logical parallels between stories and thought experimens … (Cross 1995, 
354)
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maintains that understanding discourse about possibilia as discourse about 
Artifactualist fi ctionalia provides us with a straightforward way to resolve 
certain apparent absurdities that would otherwise arise in our modal 
thinking. For instance, in our discourse about Sherlock Holmes, we may 
simultaneously maintain that
C:  Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle.
and
O: Sherlock Holmes must have been the off spring of Mr. and Mrs. 
Holmes.
yet this pair seems jointly inconsistent on its face. But given Artifactual-
ism, the apparent confl ict dissolves. It’s simply not the case that Holmes 
both has the property mentioned in C yet thereby lacks that very same 
property given the truth of O. Rather, Holmes has the property mentioned 
in C and also has the following perfectly compatible property suggested 
by O: holding the property not being created by Conan Doyle. In a perfectly 
analogous way, the apparent absurdity of maintaining both
N: No person has ever seen, visited or thought about the iron spheres 
discussed by Black in his famous thought experiment.
and
T:  Max Black has thought about the intrinsically identical iron spheres 
many times.
dissolves if we adopt Modal Artifactualism. Th e properties had by the 
individuals in question, specifi cally, holding the property never being thought 
about by anyone and being thought about by Black many times are, of course, 
perfectly compatible.26
26. Th e results of Cross’ paper show that we need to revise, to some extent, our thinking 
about how thought experiments and counterexamples work. He argues there that the iron-sphere 
story told by Black does not constitute a counterexample to Leibniz’s Law in the sense that it 
fails to constitute a story whose inter-hypothetical details contradict Leibniz’s Law. But Cross 
further argues that the extra-hypothetical facts about the (abstract, so-called) iron spheres that 
Black creates in telling his story do succeed in refuting one version of Leibniz’s Law. Th at is, the 
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5.  Modal Artifactualism vs. some closely-related rival views about possibilia 
and fi ctionalia
What’s novel about Modal Artifactualism is not that it takes the metaphysi-
cal grounds for our discourse about possibilia to be facts about actualia, 
but that the actualia in question are diff erent in kind from the possibilia 
surrogates defended by other prominent metaphysicians thinking about 
these matters. Taking the surrogates for possibilia to be the fi ctionalia of 
the Artifactualist variety allowed us to avoid the trouble presented by Fine’s 
argument. But there are other metaphysicians who maintain that possibilia 
are (abstract) individuals and can seemingly also provide a plausible reply 
to the sort of worry Fine presents. In the end, though, I believe Modal 
Artifactualism is preferable to these views.
I claimed that credence is lent to Artifactualism by the modal service it 
can provide. However, one of the most serious rivals to Modal Artifactual-
ism, Neo-Meinongianism, can also allegedly provide such a service. In fact 
I do not think that’s the case. But to defend this charge of inadequacy, I 
need to fi rst explain what Neo-Meinongianism is.27
Neo-Meinongianism presents a third fundamental option in modal 
metaphysics, that is, an alternative to actualism (as presented) and possibil-
ism (as presented). Until now, I have been treating actualism as the view 
that reality is exhausted by actualia and possibilism as the denial of this 
thesis (further, I have been treating the cognates of ‘exists’ and ‘to be’ as 
synonyms). But the Neo-Meinongian believes that to understand reality in 
this way is to gloss over the fact that there are really two modes of reality, 
existence and mere being. Th e Neo-Meinongian thinks that that which is 
spheres, according to Cross, are not indiscernible given what’s true in Black’s story, but they are 
indiscernible from a “real world” perspective. An upshot of all this, I believe, is that usually when 
we engage in modal theorizing, the properties that are germane are the ones held (and not had) 
by the hypothetical individuals in question, precisely those properties the author of the thought 
experiment stipulatively attaches to the individuals for the purpose of carrying out some bit of 
modal theorizing. But there are rare cases where some properties that are had and not held by 
the relevant individuals will turn out to do some important theoretical work.
27. Th is expression, like ‘actualism’ and ‘possibilism’, should be understood as a term of 
art here. I merely intend to be carving out three tenable views in modal metaphysics. It is less 
important to me how these terms are usually applied or whether or not the ways I am using 
them in this paper serve to pick out the precise views of any theorist. Th at said, both Terence 
Parsons (1980) and Edward Zalta (1983) present and defend theories of individuals that clearly 
seem to count as Neo-Meinongian. However, just as Lewis might not be a Lewisian and Kripke 
not a Kripkean, it is not crucial to the present paper whether Zalta or Parsons are truly Neo-
Meinongians.
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actual is that which has (i.e., exemplifi es) existence (and in this sense, she 
is a sort of actualist), but she further holds that there is a non-actual realm 
constituted by individuals that lack existence but merely are. According 
to Neo-Meinongianism, platonic, non-contingent abstracta comprise the 
realm of individuals that merely are, and (some of ) these (non-actual) 
individuals comprise the realm of possibilia (and in this sense, the view is 
a form of possibilism).28
I do not wish to consider the motivations for this view. I think the 
prominent versions of Neo-Meinongianism found in the philosophical 
literature are at least internally consistent. Rather, what I wish to discuss 
are two reasons why I think Modal Artifactualism is a preferable theory 
of possibilia.
Firstly, I think Neo-Meinongianism is epistemically less worthwhile 
for reasons not having to do with the service it can allegedly provide 
regarding possibilia. Specifi cally, the view does violence to the idea that 
the individuals mentioned in thought experiments are our creations and 
what properties that get associated with these individuals is in an impor-
tant way up to us. It seems implausible to me that we are tapping into a 
realm of eternal, platonic abstracta when we tell modal stories; that is, it 
seems implausible to think that we discover possibilia (and discover what 
properties are associated with them). I think a reasonable theory of pos-
sibilia must be one that accounts for the way in which we make up the 
realm of possibilia as we go.29 Th is, of course, is not to say we are utterly 
unconstrained in our creative activities; we don’t have free rein over the 
properties had by possibilia. For instance, we cannot create a possible 
individual that both has and lacks F-ness, or one that otherwise exempli-
28. Th is view in fact outstrips possibilism, though, as far as what constitutes reality, because 
Neo-Meinongians believe in impossible individuals (round squares and detectives who are not 
detectives) with mere being.
29. It is for these reasons that I am no Plantingean either. Plantingeans are actualists that 
argue for an identifi cation of possibilia to a very diff erent sort of surrogate, viz., haecceities, or 
individual essences. Th ese are eternal, necessarily existing “individualistic” properties that are 
never in fact exemplifi ed. On this view, our talk about Brownson, e.g., is to be understood as 
talk about the (never-exemplifi ed) property being Brownson. It thus follows on this view that 
Shoemaker literally discovered Brownson in the Platonic realm and then described what he 
found there. (It’s a good thing for the history of philosophy that he focused on the right sorts 
of details!) Much has been said by way of making these results of Neo-Meinongianism and 
Plantingeanism seem less diffi  cult to swallow, but why swallow them at all when we have in 
Modal Artifactualism a view that doesn’t entail this odd result in the fi rst place? NB: Th is usage 
of ‘Plantingeanism’ derives largely from the work of Plantinga (1974), but it’s not crucial to the 
present project that Plantinga himself turns out to be a Plantingean.
35
fi es some metaphysically impossible property. Now, we can—and often 
do—create individuals that hold both F and not-F, or ones that hold 
metaphysically impossible properties, but these are individuals that serve 
as surrogates for impossible individuals.
Modal Artifactualism is the best way to make sense of the Kripkean 
insight that certain facts about possibilia (such as facts about “trans-world” 
identity relations) are determined stipulatively. One may hold that pos-
sibilia are eternal, platonic abstracta, and hence may have reason to deny 
premise 1 of the argument for Modal Artifactualism, but this only serves 
to promote the wrongheaded notion that we are able to peer into the 
goings-on of possibilia as if using a magic telescope. It seems to me to be 
literally true that Brownson came from the imagination of Shoemaker, and 
that the intrinsically identical spheres came from the mind of Black (just 
as it’s literally true that Holmes came from the mind of Conan Doyle) 
due to the philosophical storytelling each engaged in. And I may succeed 
in referring to the numerically same Brownson or the numerically same 
spheres in virtue of stipulating (perhaps tacitly) that that’s what I intend 
to refer to when delivering a lecture on these famous thought experiments 
to my students.
Th e second worry for Neo-Meinongianism is aimed to show that the 
view cannot in fact provide the sort of modal service that Modal Artifac-
tualism can provide. Th is begins with the realization that the abstract, 
non-actual individuals that are identifi ed with possibilia seemingly cannot 
be properly individuated.
Th e Neo-Meinongian makes the further claim that possible individuals 
are those entities that correspond in the right way to (eternal, platonic) 
sets of properties.30 So, some refl ection on the nature of these sorts of 
individuals allows us to see how this view may also avoid Fine’s worry; 
possibilia need not be entities that correspond to the intuitively incorrect 
sorts of (sets of ) modal properties. For instance, according to Edward 
Zalta’s version of Neo-Meinongianism, individuals may be associated with 
properties either via an exemplifi cation or an encoding relation. Possibilia 
may encode properties that they do not exemplify, and thus a reply to Fine 
that parallels the reply made by the Modal Artifactualist is open to the 
30. Th e details surrounding this claim will diff er according to one’s preferred version of Neo-
Meinongianism. For Parsons (1980), possibilia are individuals corresponding to sets of nuclear 
(rather than extranuclear) properties; for Zalta (1983), they are individuals corresponding to sets 
of encoded (rather than exemplifi ed) properties. Th e points I make in this paragraph, I believe, 
may be adapted to either a Zalta-esque or Parsonian version of Neo-Meinongianism.
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Neo-Meinongian. Shoemaker’s Brownson, e.g., merely encodes personhood 
on this view. Yet it is this that allows Brownson to be intimately associated 
with the modal property possibly being a person; were Brownson spatio-
temporal rather than abstract, thinks Zalta, Brownson would exemplify 
personhood.
But the trouble comes when one realizes what is entailed by the view that 
possibilia are entities individuated by the sets of properties to which they 
correspond. On a view like Zalta’s, it seems as though Brownson would 
ultimately be an individual corresponding to a set of encoded properties, 
a set such as the following: {being a person, having the body of a healthy 
person, having a brain which recently occupied a diff erent body, being 
called Brownson …}. It thus follows that had Shoemaker decided to name 
the result of the hypothetical brain-transplant operation he discussed 
‘Robrown’ instead, he would have all along been talking about a com-
pletely diff erent possible individual than Brownson because the individual 
in question would have ultimately been one corresponding to a diff erent 
set of properties. But being called Robrown rather than Brownson is not 
essential to the bit of possibilia in question; no matter what the individual 
is called in the thought experiment, we are all talking about the same 
possible individual when we tell our undergraduate students (during a 
discussion of personal identity) about this famous thought experiment. 
We are, one and all, talking about Shoemaker’s creation.
Th e Neo-Meinongian might reply by claiming that we are indeed all 
talking about one and the same individual whenever we tell the basic 
story, accidental features aside, and that there are many sets that con-
tain some minimal number of properties suffi  cient for determining that 
each corresponds to a possibilium that is deserving of the name ‘Brown-
son’. Provided we are referring to an entity that corresponds to some set 
that includes is a person who recently survived a brain-transplant opera-
tion, say, we will be referring to Brownson. Th is sort of fi x will not do, 
though, because it will thus turn out that ‘Brownson’ is a wildly ambigu-
ous name. Th at is, some of the sets in question will include the accidental 
feature is called Brownson, others will include is called Robrown, etc., yet 
‘Brownson’ would seemingly refer to all of the possibilia corresponding
to each.
A view that is consistent with ‘Brownson’ behaving semantically like 
an ordinary proper name, that is, a view on which ‘Brownson’ refers to 
a unique individual if it refers at all, seems preferable here. And Modal 
Artifactualism is consistent with this sort of treatment of ‘Brownson’. 
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According to Modal Artifactualism, proper names like ‘Brownson’ refer 
to unique possibilia that are individuated by their historical properties 
(roughly, individuated by who created them), rather than individuals that 
are individuated set-theoretically. So, it seems that Neo-Meinongianism, 
unlike Modal Artifactualism, provides identity conditions for possibilia 
that are either too fi ne-grained to provide the correct results regarding 
the sameness of individuals from one thought-experiment to another, or 
too coarse-grained to account for the intuition that proper names, even 
when fi ctional, are not wildly ambiguous (whatever their content turns 
out to be).31
We should also note the diff erence between Modal Artifactualism and 
another close relative, the view known as Modal Fictionalism that was 
put forth by Gideon Rosen (1990). Rosen’s view, like Modal Artifactu-
alism, contends that modal discourse is ultimately to be understood as 
discourse about fi ctional entities. Specifi cally, he maintains that talk of 
possible worlds and their inhabitants should be understood as talk about 
what’s “true according to” the modal theory David Lewis (1986) advocates 
known as Modal Realism. Th at is, we ought to treat Modal Realism as if 
it were a grandiose fi ction. And so Rosen does, in a sense, accept the idea 
that possibilia just are fi ctionalia—the nonactual individuals Lewis’ view 
would commit us to were it instead a true work simpliciter. But Rosen 
has a very diff erent idea about the ontology of fi ctionalia from the Modal 
Artifactualist. He has the intuition that fi ctionalia are nonexistent, and 
endorses a commonsense sort of anti-realism. Rosen is no Neo-Meinon-
gian; he believes fi ctionalia are nothing at all. Th is commonsense intuition, 
the one mentioned at the beginning of this paper, is the very motivation 
for his modal metaphysics. So if his intuition is correct, and if he can 
show that our discourse about possibilia is ultimately discourse about the 
“fi ctionalia” found “in the story of ” Modal Realism, then it seems that 
he will have succeeded in showing that such discourse is ultimately about 
nothing at all (or perhaps it’s about surrogates for fi ctionalia, whatever those 
turn out to be; or perhaps it’s about whole fi ctions, whatever those turn
out to be).
But serious doubts have been raised about whether or not Rosen’s view 
is a tenable theory of modality.32 More to the point, however, if Modal 
31. Th ese objections are essentially modifi cations of some objections Th omasson gives to 
Neo-Meinongian views of fi ctionalia. See her 1999, 56f.
32. See, e.g., Fine (2003, 174-178), and Sider (2002, 34-39) for some very compelling 
criticisms of Modal Fictionalism.
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Fictionalism were a correct modal view, it would only follow that we would 
not be ontologically committed to possibilia of the sort envisaged by a 
possibilist. But what it would fail to demonstrate (what it in fact merely 
takes for granted) is that we wouldn’t be committed to merely possible 
talking donkeys, 50-foot tall women, Brownson, Black’s two spheres, and 
all the rest, in the sense of being committed to the Artifactualist fi ctionalia 
that serve as their surrogates. Th e Modal Fictionalist may have the initial 
intuition that these sorts of entities fail to exist, but given the soundness 
of van Inwagen’s argument and the parallels between works of fi ction and 
modal stories, that intuition should be abandoned.
6. Replying to three worries
I wish now to respond to three sorts of objections to Modal Artifactual-
ism. Th e fi rst runs as follows. Modal Artifactualism claims to provide us 
with the metaphysical resources to understand our talk about (Jackson’s) 
Mary, (Shoemaker’s) Brownson, and Black’s iron spheres. We say they are 
possible individuals, but in doing so, we are allegedly just making a claim 
made true by the existence of some actual-world surrogate playing some 
appropriate theoretical role. And Modal Artifactualism further tells us 
that a sentence such as ‘Mary is a brilliant neurophysiologist’ is intelligible 
because there is some contingent abstracta created by Jackson that is the 
referent of ‘Mary’.
But, the objection proceeds, those facts tell us nothing about Mary 
qua possibilia. Th at is, Modal Artifactualism (in response to Fine) tells us 
that ‘Mary is a (merely) possible person’ is literally false (because abstracta 
are not possibly people) and that this is no theoretical drawback (because 
Mary holds personhood), but this tells us nothing about how to understand 
sentences such as ‘Possibly, Mary is a person’ or ‘Possibly, Mary exists’. 
Th ese are true, of course, yet Modal Artifactualism provides no account of 
this. In virtue of what is Mary among the merely possible (people) rather 
than the impossible? Th ese are precisely the sorts of answers we are owed 
in this context, because when doing thought experiments, of primary 
importance is whether or not the entities we are talking about are things 
that are ultimately possible or impossible.
My reply to this is the following. Modal Artifactualism is not aimed at 
providing a full-fl edged, reductive account of modality itself. Th e view is 
simply concerned with providing acceptable (that is, at least actualistic) 
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metaphysical underpinnings of our discourse about merely possible indi-
viduals. A theorist such as David Lewis, on the other hand, is someone 
who is concerned with providing a full-fl edged, reductive account of 
modality. His (1986) thus provides a (possibilist) view on which ‘Possibly, 
something is F’ and ‘Something is a possible F’ are equivalent. But Modal 
Artifactualism off ers no such translation schema. I say that ‘Possibly, Mary 
is a person’ is literally true, and so it is not equivalent to the literally false 
(as explained above) ‘Mary is possibly a person’. Th e former sentence is 
true because ‘Mary’ refers to a contingent abstractum that fails to hold 
incompatible properties (that is, Mary holds properties that could be co-
exemplifi ed).
Of course, this explanation of the truth of the sentence itself relies 
on modal notions, but this is no reason to reject Modal Artifactualism. 
As other prominent actualists have noted, we may take modality itself as 
primitive, and then provide an explanation of (concepts such as) possible 
individual that ultimately relies on this primitive concept that is a theoreti-
cally worthwhile explanation in virtue of the way it illuminates the overall 
modal picture.33 Modal Artifactualism allows us to learn much about 
how our modal notions are connected one to another, even if it does not 
allow us to explain modality itself in an ultimately non-circular way. It is 
not a view that can provide a recipe for determining when a contingent 
abstractum goes proxy for a possible or an impossible individual in a way 
that doesn’t already rely on some understanding of modality, yet it is a 
view that positively informs our thinking about possible individuals (and 
other matters modal). We have quite a bit of insight into what makes 
for a consistent fi ction, and we thus gain a fair amount of insight into 
the nature of possibilia. Th is is the most that we can ask of a theory that 
respects our actualistic leanings.
Th e second objection runs as follows. Modal Artifactualism is com-
mitted to the idea that we make up possible individuals as we go, and the 
view is committed to the idea that there is a one-to-one match-up for the 
possibilia and the contingent abstracta that are created by us. But that can-
not be right; there are far too many possible individuals to be accounted 
for by our meager activities. Th e number of possibilia far outstrips the 
number of abstracta that could ever be created by us when we engage in 
our storytelling. Th ere are possible individuals that no one has ever thought 
about or will ever think about.
33. Plantinga has a lengthy and helpful discussion of these matters in his (1974).
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Here is my reply to this worry. We are all (at least, we all ought to 
be) actualists. Th at is, none of us do (or should) believe that merely pos-
sible (i.e., nonactual) individuals exist already. Consequently, it would be 
wrongheaded to think that, according to Modal Artifactualism, when we 
tell a modal story, we are thereby creating individuals that go proxy for 
some already extant possible individual. Th at is, it would be a misconstrual 
of Modal Artifactualism and the ontological facts if one were to think 
that there are too many possible individuals out there for us to make up 
enough abstracta to account for them all. Rather, there is automatically 
enough abstracta to account for all the possibilia, because whenever we 
speak intelligibly about possible individuals, some abstracta automati-
cally fi lls in the proper sort of role making our discourse intelligible. We 
must be clear on the central claim of Modal Artifactualism: the one-to-
one match-up proposed is identity—every possibilium just is a fi ctional 
individual. Hence, “each” entity necessarily comes into existence precisely 
when “the other” does.
Th e last sort of worry directly focuses on the claim made throughout 
this paper that Artifactualist fi ctionalia are well-suited to play the role of 
possibilia. It is thus a worry that indirectly is aimed at my further claim 
that Artifactualism gains credence because it provides this sort of modal 
service. Here is the objection. Th ere is no unique possibilia role to be 
played by whatever entities one proposes; there are many such roles. Now, 
Modal Artifactualism proposes entities that, if serviceable at all, are able 
to fi ll in for the possible objects we talk and think about when perform-
ing philosophical thought experiments and entertaining counterfactual 
scenarios. Th at’s all well and good, but there are other possibilia roles 
that are germane besides this one, others that must be played by the 
entities a modal theory commits us to if that theory is to gain credence 
through its serviceability, and Artifactualist fi ctionalia are ill-suited for
those roles.
What are those alternate possibilia roles? While this is not intended to 
be an exhaustive list, let us at least consider three others that, tradition-
ally, have been countenanced. (i) Possibilia are things to which we bear 
various relations and thereby make de re modal claims true or false. Th us, 
it is true of Barack Obama that he could have been born in Virginia (and 
not Hawaii), e.g., because there is some merely possible Barack Obama 
who is born in Virginia. (ii) Possibilia are the entities that make nested 
modal claims true. For instance, it seems as though “Possibly, Caesar had 
a sixth right fi nger which was never burnt but was such that, possibly, it 
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was burnt” is a true sentence, and it is true, in part at least, because there 
exists some merely possible burnt Caesarian sixth right fi nger.34 (iii) Pos-
sibilia are things that make valid various formulas of quantifi ed modal 
logic. For instance, the Barcan Formula:
BF: x  Fx   x Fx
which, when translated to English, is equivalent to:
B:   If it is possible that something is F, then something is such that it 
is possible that it is F
is valid because there are some merely possible objects that are non-identi-
cal to any actual object.
Now, the possibilist can provide an overall modal theory that relies 
on entities that are able to play roles (i)—(iii) in addition to the one 
role that the Modal Artifactualist has identifi ed. Consider Lewis’ Modal 
Realism. According to this view, nonactual possibilia are able to provide 
the grounding for the above claim about Obama because some fl esh and 
blood, otherworldly Obama—not our Obama, but a counterpart of our 
Obama—is (there) born in Virginia (and not Hawaii). Moreover, “Pos-
sibly, Caesar had a sixth right fi nger which was never burnt but was such 
that, possibly, it was burnt” is made true by Modal Realist possibilia as 
well because there exists some nonactual (fl esh and blood, otherworldly) 
fi nger that, in some nonactual world, is a burnt sixth right fi nger of (a 
six-fi ngered counterpart of our fi ve-fi ngered) Caesar. And lastly, Modal 
Realism provides the nonactual possibilia that can make valid our formulas 
of quantifi ed modal logic. BF, for example, turns out to be valid given 
that otherworldly concrete objects fail to be identical to any objects in our 
world (each concrete possibilium is “worldbound” and not “trans-world” 
according to Modal Realism).
Modal Artifactualism, it seems, is a modal theory that relies on entities 
that cannot plausibly play these three additional roles. Fictionalia, on this 
view, are our creations. As such, it seems implausible to hold that they can 
similarly ground de re modal claims, nested modal claims, and the formulas 
of quantifi ed modal logic. For instance, it would be absurd to claim that 
34. Alan McMichael (1983) is largely responsible for arguing that this is an important 
possibilia role and that actualist modal theories have a very diffi  cult time delivering surrogates 
capable of playing this role.
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Obama is possibly Virginia-born because there exists some story told by 
us in which some fi ctional individual, viz., Obama, was born there! It’s 
certainly not the case that our story-telling activities are responsible for 
grounding de re modal facts, and it’s certainly not the case that every indi-
vidual that fi gures in a modal narrative is (thereby) a fi ctional individual.
My response to this third worry is twofold. First, I admit that Modal 
Realism posits entities, viz., genuine (nonactual) possibilia, that are bet-
ter-suited to play these possibilia roles than Artifactualist fi ctionalia. It is 
indeed a more straightforwardly serviceable modal view in this respect than 
Modal Artifactualism. However, I nonetheless maintain that it is still not 
epistemically preferable. Any modal theory that commits us to possibilism 
ought to be resisted on the basis of the sheer implausibility of its ontology. 
Now, I do not think that possibilist modal views such as Lewis’ ought to 
be resisted at all costs, but if an actualistically acceptable rival exists, one 
ought to be an actualist instead. Any actualist view will automatically come 
at less of an ontological cost than any form of possibilism (while it won’t 
be anywhere near free—contingent abstract individuals are, for instance, 
admittedly rather odd), and thus if some amount of sacrifi ce has to be 
made with respect to serviceability, then so be it. Serviceability is not the 
only desideratum to take into account.
Second, I maintain that Modal Artifactualism in fact provides just such 
an actualistically acceptable rival. It is a view that not only fails to rely on 
a wild ontology of nonactual individuals, it is a view that is serviceable to 
a high-enough degree. Artifactualism is not as robustly serviceable as Modal 
Realism, e.g., but it’s at least serviceable in the way that I have argued for 
at length here. Moreover, it is not utterly silent about the relationship of 
fi ctionalia to the roles (i), (ii), and (ii) above, and in some cases, it is quite 
forthcoming.
As for (i): Modal Artifactualism was never intended to be a theory 
that provides the grounding for all our de re modal claims. Th at is, it was 
never put forth as a theory of what’s necessary and possible for all extant 
individuals, e.g., Barack Obama, that may get “imported” into our modal 
stories. Rather, it’s simply intended as a theory of merely possible indi-
viduals, and that turns out to mean that it’s a theory that applies only to 
individuals that in the fi rst instance are introduced via our modal storytell-
ing. It is these individuals that are fi ctional, and these individuals that are 
then “exported” to the non-fi ctional world, so to speak. Obama is not a 
fi ctional individual—he was introduced into the world not by an author, 
but by his parents—although fi ctions can be told about him. Th e Modal 
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Artifactualist may then say that the truth of de re modal claims about 
non-fi ctional, actual individuals such as Obama, then, is not determined 
by his holding of any properties in any story about him; rather, all and 
only the modal properties associated with him are the ones he has, and it 
is only these extra-fi ctional facts that make true (or false) any de re modal 
claims about Obama.35
As for (ii): Modal Artifactualism does have something positive to say 
about how to understand nested modal claims. Consider the specifi c 
example from above, due, as far as I am aware, to Takashi Yagisawa (2008). 
Now, Caesar himself has the following property: possibly having a sixth right 
fi nger that was possibly burnt, but because of the reasons just given regarding 
de re modal claims, we know that this is not due to the way Caesar fi gures 
into some fi ction. It’s possible that some fi nger be a possibly burnt sixth 
right Caesarian fi nger, however, because the individual in question here, 
viz., the possible sixth right fi nger of Caesar, is a fi ctional individual. Th at 
is, there was some modal story, one fi rst told by Yagisawa when he gave 
this example of nested modality in order to discuss this possibilia role and 
advance our philosophical thinking, about a merely possible sixth right 
fi nger of Caesar that was possibly burnt.
Crucially, what Modal Artifactualism tells us is that we cannot think 
about nested modality without thinking about the goings-on in some 
modal story. With this case, we may gain insight into the modal features of 
the relevant individuals not by thinking about the truth of any de re claim 
about Caesar or any actual (fl esh and blood, Caesarian) fi nger. Rather, we 
may gain modal insight by realizing that there is a property that is held 
by a fi ctional fi nger (that is, some contingent, abstract artifact) as a result 
of the storytelling activities of Yagisawa, specifi cally, being a possibly burnt 
right sixth Caesarian fi nger.
As for (iii): Artifactualist fi ctionalia do seem to me to be fairly ill-suited 
to provide the resources to explain the semantics of quantifi ed modal logic. 
35. Mary, however, is a fi ctional individual—she was introduced into the world by an 
author, viz., Frank Jackson—and as such, she both has and holds various modal properties that 
are relevant to the truth of de re modal claims about her. For instance, the following is true of 
Mary: she fails to have the property possibly being a person. However, the following is also true 
of her: she has the property possibly holding the property of seeing blue rather than red when fi rst 
exiting her black and white laboratory. She has the latter property because Jackson is such that 
he could have told his story in a slightly diff erent way than he in fact did. Th at is, if it were the 
case that Jackson had told a slightly modifi ed version of his story, the following would have 
been true of Mary: she holds the property seeing blue rather than red when fi rst exiting her black 
and white laboratory.
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An appeal to fi ctionalia of this sort would likely serve to only muddy the 
logical waters. Th at is, using contingent abstracta as the indices in our 
modal logical models would likely lead to much more confusion than 
clarity in the study of logic. Possibilia of the Modal Realist variety seem 
better suited for this role. Why? Well, given that Modal Realism says that 
reality is constituted by an actual world and an infi nity of nonactual worlds, 
we have in Modal Realism a reality that provides a ready-made guide for 
understanding modal logic semantics.
But a reality that is ready-made in this way for the study of modal logic 
is not required to make valid our modal logical formulas. What we need to 
make valid our modal logic formulas are simply models with “actual and 
nonactual universes of discourse” (that is, sets), the entities “in” (that is, 
those that are members of ) those universes, and some specifi ed accessibility 
relations among those entities. What’s in these logical universes may not 
have anything to do with the modal structure of reality at all. Specifi cally, it 
need not be the case that they are populated by actualia and nonactual pos-
sibilia—the entities in these universes could be pineapples or coff ee mugs 
(or Artifactualist fi ctionalia!) for all that matters to logic, so long as some 
are designated “actual” and others “nonactual”. So, to admit that Modal 
Realist possibilia can play this role is a hollow sort of victory for the ser-
viceability of such a view. If the entities that Modal Realism relies on exist, 
then Modal Realism is serviceable in this regard, but even if they do not, 
we still have the means to make valid our quantifi ed modal logic formulas.
So, whatever loss in serviceability Artifactualism cedes to a possibilist 
view such as Modal Realism with respect to (iii) does not seem to be a loss 
of serviceability that detracts from the central thesis defended in this paper. 
Th at is, given that it’s a possibilia role that need not be played by any of 
the things that make a theory a modal theory, Modal Realism doesn’t seem 
to gain much utility here (at least, no more than any theory that commits 
us to pineapples or coff ee cups, for instance). Th e individuals that most 
any theory (modal or nonmodal) commits us to will be able to provide 
the same sort of modal logical service.36
36. One may complain here that I have missed the point. We are not merely interested in 
entities that may make valid the formulas of any old, perhaps wildly implausible, modal logic. 
BF, e.g., when faithfully translated into English is true, and thus the entities that make BF valid 
must be ones posited by a true modal theory. In reply, I say that whether or not BF—when 
translated into English—is true is beside the point. A logic can be a worthwhile theoretical tool 
and not fully mirror reality, so entities (like pineapples or coff ee cups) posited by some view 
that doesn’t truly refl ect the modal structure of reality can still be entities that provide the same 
modal logical service under consideration that Modal Realism can provide. In other words, (iii) 
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7. Conclusion
To sum things up: When all is said and done, the solution to the fi ctio-
nalia/possibilia problem ought to be found in a theory of fi ctionalia and 
possibilia that is based on a sensible actualist ontology, is serviceable to a 
high-enough degree (i.e., is suffi  ciently illuminating regarding the nature 
of possible objects and their relation to fi ctional objects and the rest of 
reality), and lacks the drawbacks of the rival modal views that posit actualia 
as surrogates for possibilia. While I do not pretend to have provided in 
this paper a knock-down argument in favor of the conclusion that Modal 
Artifactualism is just such a theory, I hope that I have shown that it is a 
serious contender. For the reasons given here, I think it is the contender 
that is the most epistemically worthwhile.37
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